BUNGLING BUNDLING: THE HONEST LEADERSHIP AND OPEN GOVERNMENT
ACT IS TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK FOR BUNDLING REFORM
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Money, like water, will always find an outlet."1 Such is the cyclical nature of
campaign finance law – when public outrage leads to laws that restrict one fundraising
outlet, political professionals adapt to find another outlet.2 When the Watergate scandal
spurred comprehensive campaign finance restrictions, politicians turned to “soft
money.”3 When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) banned “softmoney” and increased individual contribution limits,4 individual fundraisers became a
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popular outlet for campaign money.5 Meanwhile, the role of money in campaigns has
steadily increased.6
Today, “bundlers” (fundraisers who solicit checks from individual donors for a
particular candidate)7 play a major role in the campaign finance system and often gain
prominence and influence through their fundraising efforts.8 Though not a new practice,
bundling experienced resurgence after Bush proved its powerful potential in the 2000
Presidential election.9 Meanwhile, public discomfort with the practice has grown,
spurred by a series of high-profile scandals involving bundlers. Because bundlers
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deliver other people’s money rather than their own, however, their campaign finance
activities often go totally undisclosed.10
Norman Hsu was once a poster boy for would-be bundlers. An entrepreneurial
immigrant to the United States, Hsu became an elite democratic fundraiser by bundling
millions of dollars for democratic candidates, including $850,000 for Hillary Clinton,11
who even made a live appearance at his birthday party via closed-circuit television.12
After federal officials discovered he was reimbursing contributors and fraudulently
obtaining money from investors, however, he quickly became the poster boy for
bundling abuse.13
Such scandals highlight problems associated with bundling. For example,
bundlers can circumvent existing contribution limits by reimbursing those from whom
they bundle checks.14 Fundraising scandals also raise concerns about corruption
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13

Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Hsu Is Accused of Ponzi Scheme, Wall Street Journal, Sept.

12, 2007, at A4
14

See e.g. id.

3

because large bundlers enjoy access to politicians through bundling.15 Finally, bundling
often has an appearance of corruption, which can undermine public confidence in the
democratic process, even if actual corruption does not exist.16
Until recently, most bundling was not a matter of public record.17 However, the
newly enacted Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (“HLOGA” or “the
Act”) requires congressional candidates to disclose lobbyist bundling. HLOGA’s
bundling provision (“the Provision”) is a positive first step towards tackling the problems
associated with bundling.18 While the Supreme Court has held that some disclosure
requirements run afoul of the First Amendment, HLOGA’s bundling measure is likely
constitutional because it is justified by the government’s interests of preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption, providing valuable information to voters
and assisting in the enforcement of other campaign finance laws.19 HLOGA’s bundling
provision, however, does not go far enough. The law should be drafted to require
15
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disclosure of all federal bundling activity by applying to all bundlers (whether lobbyist or
otherwise) and all campaigns (whether congressional or presidential).
Part II for this note details the rise of bundling in campaigns, illuminating its
associated problems. Part III examines HLOGA’s bundling disclosure provision,
discusses its shortcomings, and concludes that it fails to remedy several serious
problems associated with bundling. Part IV asserts that HLOGA does not violate the
First Amendment and represents a constructive step towards much-needed bundling
reform. Part V proposes that effective bundling law must go beyond HLOGA to include
all federal bundling activity, discussing policy and constitutional justifications.
II.
A.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF BUNDLING

Pioneers of the Wild West – The Rise of Big Bundling

The 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) prohibited “soft money”20
contributions to national political parties.21 BCRA’s drafters probably “did not anticipate
that the ban would simply divert the flow of big contributions into other channels.”22 Or
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20year.htm (1995).
21

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f), 441(i) (2002).

22

Id.

5

perhaps BCRA was intended as a sort of “legislative triage,”23 that focused on “solving
the most dangerous campaign finance problems facing America” at the time.24 In any
case, as soft money evaporated and candidates abandoned underfunded public
financing (and its associated spending limits), candidates embracing the practice of
bundling “hard money”.25
23
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One commentary characterizes the current fundraising frenzy as a new “Wild
West era.”26 Though bundling had been around for some time, President George W.
Bush proved a pioneer of the “Wild West era,” when he revolutionized the practice of
bundling during his 2000 presidential bid. A few years earlier, four of Bush’s longtime
supporters developed a name and structure for an elite group of contributors, whose
goal was to escape the restraints of a public financing system enacted to reduce the
influence of money in elections.27 Their means to achieve this goal was to create a
network of people who could find at least 100 family members, friends, associates
and/or employees willing to contribute the maximum individual donation allowed by law
to a presidential candidate: $1,000, at the time.28 Aptly named “Pioneers,” Bush’s cadre
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machine.”29
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By 2004, Bush’s fundraising machine included corporate CEOs, Wall Street
financial leaders, Washington lobbyists and Republican officials.30 That campaign
raised more than $76 million, or 29% of Bush’s primary budget, from bundling
“Pioneers” – who raised at least $100,000 – and “Rangers” – who raised at least
$200,000.31 John Kerry followed suit, accumulating almost $42 million, or around 17%
of his primary campaign budget, from 298 “Co-Chairs” who raised at least $50,000 and
226 “Vice Chairs” who raised at least $100,000.32 In the end, the amount of money
raised in the 2004 election broke nearly every campaign fundraising record.33 Despite
the record-breaking funds raised, both candidates voluntarily disclosed extensive
information about their bundlers.34
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Because fundraising prowess is increasingly viewed as a mark of candidate
viability, the 2008 presidential race appears destined to raise more bundled money than
ever before.35 With more than a quarter of a billion dollars raised as of September
2007, the 2008 race was already the most costly in U.S. history.36 To prepare for the
election and display their fundraising aptitude, all major presidential hopefuls tapped
their bundling networks. Hillary Clinton depended on an army of “HillRaisers”.37 Rudy
Giuliani employed a roster of “Pitchers,” “Sluggers,” “Captains,” and "All-American Team
Captains," the latter pledging to collect $1 million in bundled contributions.38 Notably,
although Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have voluntarily agreed to disclose some of
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their bundlers, none of the 2008 candidates has met the same voluntary disclosure
standards of Bush and Kerry in 2004.39
B.

“Bundled Bundling” – When Bundling Goes Bad

“A gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction.”40
While there is nothing inherently wrong with vigorous fundraising, a major
concern is that bundling creates a climate ripe for corruption and influence buying, or at
the very least, can carry an appearance of impropriety.41 News stories exposing highprofile bundlers involved in illegal activities (both inside fundraising and outside of
fundraising) has legitimized that concern.42
Though the media have reported many cases of “bungled bundling,”43 perhaps
the most egregious is that of Norman Hsu, a leading Democratic fundraiser, who raised
39
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more than $800,000 for Hillary Clinton and contributed more than $600,000 to other
federal, state and municipal candidates from 2004-07.44 In all, Mr. Hsu collected well
over $1 million in small checks for candidates, making him one of the biggest
fundraisers in the nation.45 Hsu turned out to also be a fugitive, after fleeing from a 15year old conviction of felony grand theft for his role in a scheme to grand theft for his
role in a scheme to defraud investors.46 Before his fugitive status came to light, Hsu
44

Mike McIntire & Leslie Wayne, Democrats Turn from Big Donor Who’s Fugitive, N.Y.

Times, Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/us/politics/31hsu.html;
Ianthe Jeane Dugan & Brody Mullins, Leading Clinton Donor Stays Below the Radar,
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 29, 2007, at A6. Other candidates have run into problematic
bundlers.

The Obama campaign gave $40,000 to charity that it collected from a

fundraiser who was later indicted on corruption charges; the Edwards campaign
returned the personal portion of $80,000 that a fundraiser collected from family and lawfirm partners; one of Mitt Romney’s bundlers was indicted with multiple fraud and other
charges. Likewise, George Bush’s “pioneers” included Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, who
was convicted of fraud and conspiracy (vacated after his death), and lobbyist Jack
Abramoff, who was sentenced to prison for fraud, tax evasion and bribery.
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was considered one of an elite group of investors capable of raising $1 million.47 This
enabled him special perks, such as repeated access to candidates.48
After the Wall Street Journal broke a story about Hsu, he was arrested and
charged Hsu with additional fraud and election-law violations. Federal prosecutors
believe that Hsu ran a massive “Ponzi scheme”49 that cost investors more than $60
million.50 Further, Hsu used his status as a top political fundraiser to gain investors’
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abnormally high returns to investors from money paid into the scheme by subsequent
investors, rather than from net revenues generated by real business. U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Nov.
14, 2007).
50
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Accused of Ponzi Scheme, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 12, 2007, at A4 (“Federal
prosecutors said in a criminal complaint that Democratic fund-raiser Norman Hsu
pressured investors to make campaign contributions through him in order to raise his
public profile -- then used his prominence to find more investors for illegal Ponzi
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trust in his phony investments.51 One investor said, “I figured if Hillary trusted him, I
could trust him."52 Hsu also used his status as a high-yield investor to coerce business
contacts into making donations to his candidates of choice.53 One Hsu donor who
contributed to Hillary Clinton noted that he was a lifelong Republican who contributed
because he feared being cut out of Hsu’s next lucrative deal; another angry investor
demanded that the Clinton campaign to return his check saying, “I was a donor who had
my arm twisted to make a contribution to Hillary Clinton's campaign on behalf of
Norman Hsu."54
In addition to fraud charges, the federal complaint filed against Hsu alleged that
Hsu donated money to politicians under other people’s names and reimbursed donors
for checks he solicited.55 In August 2007, the Wall Street Journal reported that one of
51
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This article also discusses other bundlers who were caught reimbursing contributors
from whom they collected checks. A Wisconsin developer, for example, pled guilty to
repaying others for their donations; likewise, the former chairman of a Miami-based
engineering firm pled guilty to crimes related to funneling $200,000 to $400,000 in illegal
donations to congressional candidates from Florida to Alaska. Id.
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Clinton’s biggest sources of campaign donations was a tiny 1,280-square-foot green
house in a working-class neighborhood near San Francisco International Airport.56 The
owners of the home, the Paw family, were long-time Hsu associates who lived off a
meager income from a gift shop and mail carrier salary.57 In addition to once listing the
Paw home as his address58, Hsu’s donations mirrored the Paw family’s donations in
terms of timing, amounts and donees.59 Though the Paws deny that Hsu reimbursed
them, federal prosecutors believe Hsu reimbursed the family for their donations.60
Hsu’s story illustrates several problems associated with bundling, specifically,
circumvention of existing campaign finance law and the appearance of corruption.
While it is legal for individuals to ask friends, colleagues and family members to make
donations to political candidates, it is illegal to coerce them into giving or to reimburse
them.61 Reimbursing donors for contributions effectively circumvents existing
contribution limits because it allows an individual to contribute more than the legal limit.
Further, when bundlers are involved in illegal activities outside of fundraising, it raises
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serious suspicions that their bundled contributions may come from illegal sources such
as foreign, hidden, coerced or reimbursed sources.62
C.

Profile of a Bundler: Who They Are and Why They Matter

While some bundlers are lobbyists, most are not.63 A joint Campaign Finance
Institute-Public Citizen study of over 2,000 individuals reported to be raising
contributions for the 2008 presidential candidates found that 56 percent of the
fundraisers came from three industries: lawyers and law firms, three finance industries,
and real estate.64 Notably, lobbyists were only the sixth most common industry,
representing just 61 (around 3%) of the 2017 reported fundraisers.65

62

Bill Getz, Chinese Donor Sounds Like ’96, Washington Times, Sept. 4, 2007, at

http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070904/NATION/
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Edsall, Pioneers Fill War Chest, Then Capitalize, supra note 26 (noting that about onefifth of Bush’s 2000 Pioneers were professional lobbyists).
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at http://www.cfinst.org/pr/prRelease.aspx?ReleaseID=176.
65
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Thus, law firms and businesses, whose profitably is directly affected by
government regulatory and tax policies, make up a large.66 Others are individuals who
are motivated by a broad range of interests such as political ideology, political
aspirations or power. However, their purpose could be “more nefarious, such as
Norman Hsu’s alleged scheme to acquire credibility among investors, or, worse yet, it
could be used to obtain government contracts, tax breaks, earmarks or public
policies.”67
If big bundling buys bundlers nothing else, it buys them access to candidates.68
Such access raises corruption concerns, or at the very least, the appearance of
corruption. "The fact that we have great numbers of these individuals raising larger and
larger sums means there are going to be more individuals, postcampaign, making

66

Thomas B. Edsall, Pioneers Fill War Chest, Then Capitalize, supra note 26 (noting

that half of Bush’s 2000 Pioneers were heads of companies whose profitably was
affected by government regulatory and tax decisions).
67

Press Release, FEC Should Develop Full Disclosure System for Campaign Bundling

Activity, Public Citizen, Nov. 30, 2007 at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?
ID=2557.
68

Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14 (“Campaigns encourage

ambitious bundling by rewarding top fund-raisers with perks, including access to
candidates”).
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claims for policy preferences and ambassadorial posts."69 Candidates adamantly deny
that they give special preference to campaign contributors when making policy or
personnel decisions,70 but even if the candidates have good intentions, it is nearly
impossible to separate the money and the relationships that come with the money.71
Election law experts argue whether money can actually be traced to politicians’

69

Thomas B. Edsall, Pioneers Fill War Chest, Then Capitalize, supra note 26 (quoting

Anthony Corrado, a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution and a political scientist at
Colby College).
70
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Jan.
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2000,

at

http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/e955.htm (Senator John McCain denied that his
decision in favor of a major campaign benefactor by influenced by contributions);
Roberto Suro & Juliet Eilperin, Loral Denies Benefits in Return for Donations,
Washington Post, May 19, 1998, at A03 (President Clinton’s administration denied that
the Chinese government sought to buy influence by coordinating a plan to illegally
funnel as much as $2 million into U.S. political campaigns).
71

Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14. The article also

provides an example of contributions and favors. When Kenneth Lay, a 2000 Pioneer
and then-chairman of Enron, was a member of the Energy Department transition team,
he sent White House personnel director Clay Johnson III a list of eight persons he
recommended for appointment to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Two
were named to the five-member commission. Id.
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policies,72 but regardless of whether actual corruption takes place, the appearance of
impropriety can undermine public confidence in the democratic process.
Further, as the amount of money required for successful campaigns steadily
increases, so does bundlers’ importance to candidates. “The pressures of unlimited,
arms-race spending has put the highest premium on presidential candidates finding
bundlers who can raise huge amounts of money and the lowest premium on filtering out
problematic bundlers.”73 Thus, it is unrealistic to expect campaigns to police
themselves to identify problematic bundlers.
Fixing all problems associated with bundling requires a multi-pronged
approached invoking various campaign finance tools. However, this article focuses on
disclosure as a tool for reducing several serious problems associated with bundling. To
begin, we must first understand current election law related to disclosure generally and
bundling specifically.

72

See generally Rodney A. Smith, Money, Power, and Elections (2006) (arguing that

there is no evidence that money actually influences political decisions on a large-scale);
but see generally Stacy B. Gordon, Campaign Contributions and Legislative
Voting: A New Approach (2005) (arguing that contributions have a real affect on
congressional voting on issues that are most important to large contributors).
73

Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14 (interviewing Fred

Wertheimer, the president of Democracy 21, a nonpartisan Washington-based group
dedicated to reducing the influence of money in politics).
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III.

HONEST AND OPEN? BUNDLING LAW AND THE HONEST LEADERSHIP
AND OPEN GOVERNMENT ACT
A.

Of Intermediaries and Conduits – A First Attempt at Bundling
Legislation

In Buckley, the Court anticipated the use of “intermediaries or conduits” to
circumvent FECA’s contribution limits. Federal regulations74 appeared impose some
direct disclosure legislation on bundling – requiring reporting and record keeping for
contributions received and forwarded by a “conduit or intermediary” to authorized
committees of Federal candidates.75 Statute provides that
all contributions made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on
behalf of a particular candidate, including contributions which are
in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an
intermediary or conduit to such candidate, shall be treated as
contributions from such person to such candidate. The intermediary
or conduit shall report the original source and the intended recipient
of such contribution to the (Federal Election) Commission and to the
intended recipient.76
Under the statute, a “conduit or intermediary” must report to the FEC and the
recipient candidate77 the name, mailing address, occupation, and employer of any
individual who makes a contribution of more than $200.78 The recipient must then
identify in its reports any conduit that provided one or more earmarked contributions
above $200, the total amount of contributions made through that conduit, and
74

2 U.S.C. 441(a)(8); 11 CFR 110.6.

75

NPRM at 4.

76

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8)(2008).

77

11 C.F.R. § 110.6(c)(1)(i).

78

11 C.F.R. § 110.6(c)(1)(iv)(A).
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identifying information for individuals contributing more than $200.79 Thus, earmarked
contribution disclosure is virtually identical to other contribution disclosure.80 The
difference under 11 C.F.R. S 110.6 is that where a “conduit or intermediary” exercises
“direction or control” over the choice of a recipient candidate, the “conduit or
intermediary” must report this to the recipient candidate.81 The entire amount of the
contribution is then credited to both the original contributor and the “conduit or
intermediary.”82
The description of contributions being directed through “conduits or
intermediaries” appears to describe bundling – the “direction” being a bundlers
solicitation of funds and the “conduit or intermediary” being the bundler. However,
these rules are widely misunderstood and largely dormant.83 When the FEC initially
interpreted this law, it suggested that the law applied to some bundling activity.84 The
79

11 C.F.R § 110.6(c)(2)(i)-(ii).

80

Geoffrey M. Wardle, Political Contributions and Conduits After Charles Keating and

Emily’s List: An Incremental Approach to Reforming Federal Campaign Finance, 46 Cal.
W. L. Rev. 531 (1996).
81

11 C.F.R S 110.6(d)(1).

82

11 C.F.R S 110.6(d)(2).

83

Bob Bauer, A Bundle of Issues: The FEC’s Proposed Bundling Rules, Oct. 27, 2007,

http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/ news.html?AID=1116 (noting these rules are
poorly understood and largely dormant).
84

See Internal Transfers of Funds by Candidates or Committees (AO 1975-10), 1 Fed.

Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) ¶ 5116 (Aug. 21, 1975)(the FEC initially found “some
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FEC later liberalized its interpretation, however, concluding that a party’s
recommendation to contribute to a specific candidate does not constitute “direction or
control” if the contribution is initially sent to the soliciting conduit.85 In 1992, the FEC's
inconsistent application of the “direction or control” clause rendered the law
“meaningless”.86 The D.C. Court of Appeals declined to apply the “direction and control”
disclosure requirements to a PAC that solicited contributions to be divided equally

control” existed when conduits requested that donors “earmark” previously made
contributions); see also Employee Group as Political Committee (RE: AOR 1976-92), 2
Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) ¶ 6951 (Nov. 10, 1976) (the FEC found control
where a PAC recommended or solicited a contribution from a PAC participant’s private
account).
85
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among four unnamed candidates identified only by their state of residence.87 The court
stated: “(t)o find direction or control on these facts would require a substantial shift in
the Commission's construction of the language contained in § 110.6(d)”88 Thus, the
“direction and control” clause has “virtually no effect” on bundling today.89
B. Laws That Give Bundling Structure and Limits
Several laws indirectly affect bundling by providing it with structure and limits.
Contribution limits, for example, dictate the maximum amount bundlers can collect from
each donor. Likewise, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) and
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) require a bundler who receives and forwards a
contribution directly to a political committee to forward the contribution within 10 days
and, if the contribution is more than $50, include the date of receipt and the name and
address of the person making the contribution.90
87

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d 1471, 1478

(D.C. Cir. 1992).
88
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Lobbyist/Registrants and Lobbyist/Registrant PACs, Federal Election Commission,
Oct. 26, 2007, http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2007/mtgdoc07-71.pdf at 4 [hereafter
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C. HLOGA’s Bundling Provision: Lobbyist Disclosure in Congressional
Campaigns
Though they depend on bundling, some political leaders have echoed public
discomfort with bundling. 2008 presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama, for
example, pledged to reject contributions bundled by registered federal lobbyists and
political action committees. In an opinion piece endorsing bundling disclosure entitled
“The Problem with Bundled Money,” Obama said:
When it comes to reforming Washington and limiting the power of special
interests, a man who died more than 60 years ago had exactly the right
idea. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said, ‘Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.’ . . .
Nearly a century later, we find Washington in need of a lot of sunlight and
disinfectant.”91
The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 200792 amends the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)93 to provide more vigorous
91

Barack Obama, Op-Ed, The Problem with Bundling Money, Chicago Tribune, May

21, 2007, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-42f3tq7may21
,1,1963769.story?ctrack=1&cset=true. Still, Obama has enlisted 314 bundlers, several
of whom work for law firms that also lobby, including Thomas Reed of Kirkpatrick &
Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP and Robert Litt of Arnold & Porter LLP. Jonathan D.
Salant, Watergate-Era Fundraising Returns with Clinton, Obama, Guliani, Bloomberg,
Nov.

4,

2007,

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid=

aEey9CmFJ37Q&refer=home.
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Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 204,

121 Stat. 735 (2007).
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2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.
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requirements with respect to disclosure and enforcement of ethics and lobbying laws.94
HLOGA’s stated purpose is “[t]o provide greater transparency in the legislative
process.”95 Initial versions of the Act did not include bundling reform,96 but Senators
Feingold and Obama introduced the bundling provision, which eventually became
section 204 “Disclosure of Bundled Contributions.”97
HLOGA’s bundling provision requires candidates’ political committees (i.e.,
candidate committees, political action committees) to file reports every six months with
the Federal Election Commission.98 The reports must include the name, address, and
94

Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 204,

121 Stat. 735 (2007).
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Act” and Other Rules Changes by the 100th Congress (Steve France & Toby
McIntosh, eds., Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 2007) (emphasis added) (hereafter
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employer of each person who is reasonably known to have forwarded, or who is
credited with raising, two or more bundled contributions totaling more than $15,000.99
The Act defines “person” as registered lobbyists100 or political action committees
established or controlled by a lobbyist or lobbying organization.101 Accordingly, though
the word “person” would appear to apply to all bundlers, the Act specifies that it only
applies to lobbyist bundlers. Thus, as noted in the previous section, a majority of
bundling activity would continue to be undisclosed because the vast majority of
bundlers, at least in Presidential campaigns, are not bundlers.102 The Act also only

99

2 U.S.C. 434(i); New Rules, supra note 98.

100
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(study

applies

to

applies to congressional campaigns, leaving the more expensive and potentially more
problematic presidential campaigns completely unchecked.103
In October 2007, the FEC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”)
outlining several vague aspects of the Act.104 For example, the phrase “credited with
raising” is problematic when multiple lobbyists are present at or co-host a single
fundraiser.105 For example, it was unclear whether a lobbyist who co-hosts an event but
plays no role in raising funds should be credited for funds raised.106 Similarly, should
each co-host be credited with the full amount of the contributions raised at the event or
should the total amount raised at the event be divided evenly among all co-hosts?
These examples illustrate that under the law’s current language the total amount
reported from such an event might be misleading or inaccurate.107
Another problem is that the Act does not specify whether mandatory reporting
extends to fundraising by persons who are not lobbyists but raise funds as employees
or agents of a lobbyist or lobbying organizations.108 A section-by-section analysis of the
Act, indicates that it only covers contributions credited to registered lobbyists
103

Id.; NPRM at 1.

104

NPRM at 4.

105

Id. at 14-15; Bob Bauer, A Bundle of Issues: The FEC’s Proposed Bundling Rules,

Oct. 27, 2007, http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/news.html?AID=1116.
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themselves, and not to those collected by their employees or agents.109 During a
discussion on the Senate floor, however, Senators Feingold and Obama indicated that a
lobbyist’s employee who bundles a contribution would be subject to the disclosure
requirements if the employee were acting as an agent of the lobbyist, even if the
employee were not himself a registered lobbyist.110 Under this view, lobbyists would
receive credit for funds collected by their employees or agents,111 which would prevent
circumvention of HLOGA by closing a potential loophole by which lobbyists could avoid
disclosure by using employees to bundle contributions.112 Because employees may act
on behalf of lobbyists, their funds should be credited to their employer.113 This concept
conforms with the application of other FECA requirements regarding agents, such as
“soft money” fundraising restrictions, which apply to both federal candidates and their
"agents.”114 Applying the “agent” concept to the HLOGA would take bundling rules in a
similar direction by requiring lobbyists to disclose employee bundling activity.115
The FEC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking also illuminated HLOGA’s potential
implications on contribution limits. “Under current FEC regulations, a bundler may be
109
110

NPRM at 14 (referencing 153 Cong. Rec. S10709 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007)).
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subjected to a charge against its contribution limit for the full amount raised and
transmitted to a candidate.”116 This rule would resurrect the “conduit or intermediary”
rules discussed in the previous section and would apply when a bundler exercises
"direction or control" over the contribution.117 “Not much has happened under these
rules for years: [the rules] are largely dormant and certainly poorly understood.”
However, as noted in the Notice for Proposed Rulemaking, the FEC is considering
whether bundled contribution disclosures should "double count" by crediting such
contributions to the original contributor as well as the bundler’s own limit.118 Such
“double count” rules apply in other campaign finance law, such as when a PAC collects
and forwards contributions to a candidate,119 where the amount collected counts
towards the PAC’s limit as well as that of the original contributor.120 The “double count”
interpretation would be a step toward “reinvigorating . . . limit-based bundling
restrictions” from the “exercise and control” clause. 121 These potential bundling
contribution limits arguably have a far greater effect on bundling than HLOGA’s
disclosure requirements.122
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IV.

HLOGA’s BUNDLING PROVISION IS LIKELY CONSTITUTIONAL
After interpreting what the Provision means, the next step is to analyze whether it

is constitutional. This is necessary because the Provision impacts the First Amendment
rights of speech and association. Part A discusses the constitutional framework for
disclosure law and its historical context. The framework provides a method for
analyzing the Provision, while the historical framework traces the cyclical nature of
campaign finance reform and adaptation by political professionals. Part B analyzes the
Provision under the constitutional framework, concluding that it is likely constitutional.
A.

Disclosure Law: Historical Context & Constitutional Framework

More than 120 years ago in Ex parte Yarborough, the Supreme Court held that
congressional power to regulate elections included the authority to protect elections
against two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, “open violence and
insidious corruption.”123 The Court described the source of corruption as the “free
use of money in elections . . . .”124 Fifty years later, the Court endorsed disclosure a
means of combating corruption in campaigns.125 In Burroughs v. United States,126 the
Court deferred to the Congress’ conclusion that public disclosure of contributions would

123

Id. (quoting Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884) (emphasis added).

124
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discourage the corrupt influence of money in elections.127 The Court reasoned that
Congress’s power to protect the election of the President and Vice President implicitly
included discretion to select the means of achieving that end.128
In 1974, “[u]pon signing the most systematic restrictions on campaign finance in
American history, President Gerald Ford declared, ‘the times demand this
legislation.’”129 The times he referred were the Watergate times and the systemic
campaign finance restrictions were the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act (“FECA”).130
The Watergate scandal enflamed public concerns about corruption in the
government, illuminating the potential for corruption inherent in campaign financing.131
While commonly associated with presidential abuse of power, Watergate also involved
campaign finance abuse.132 For example, Nixon’s Committee for Reelection of the
President used money derived from campaign contributions133 to hire burglars to break
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128
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into the Democratic National Committee headquarters.134 Nixon’s campaign
committees also violated an array of campaign finance laws, including raising more than
$500,000 from illegal sources to finance “dirty tricks” against Nixon’s enemies and to
cover-up the DNC burglary.135 Further, links between Nixon’s campaign contributions
and his policy decisions and ambassador suggested impropriety.136 Finally, the
Watergate crisis and Nixon’s subsequent resignation caused widespread public outcry
and distrust of the government, creating “a political climate where congressional
majorities could pass virtually any restrictions on campaign finance.”137
Reacting to public concerns and disillusionment, Congress passed amendments
to the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).138 The amendments regulated several
aspects of campaign finance including disclosure of donations, public funding for
presidential campaigns, and creation of the Federal Election Commission.139 In the
134
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lodestar campaign finance decision Buckley v. Valeo,140 the Supreme Court upheld a
FECA disclosure provision that required individuals and groups who expressly
advocated for or against a federal candidate to disclose their related contributions and
expenditures.141 The Court applied “intermediate scrutiny,” stating that to be upheld, a
disclosure provision must be justified by an important public interest and have a
relevant correlation or substantial relation to the public interest being served.142 In
rejecting a First Amendment challenge,143 the Court held that FECA’s disclosure
requirements furthered three “sufficiently important” interests: (1) deterring actual and
apparent corruption; (2) providing information to voters, and (3) aiding in the
enforcement of other campaign finance law.144
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In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the Court “frequently upheld FECA’s disclosure
framework.”145 In the 1990’s, however, the Court’s disclosure opinions became more
unpredictable.146 Twenty years after Buckley in McIntyre v Ohio Elections
Commission,147 the Supreme Court “seemed to draw back from [the] relatively relaxed
standards applied to the review of mandated disclosures.”148 In McIntyre, the Court
appeared to employ a strict scrutiny standard of review and conduct a searching
overbreadth analysis, requiring narrow tailoring of a compelling government interest.149
The law at issue required ballot initiatives materials to disclose on their face the
name of the entity providing the literature.150 An elderly pamphleteer challenged a fine
imposed on her for distributing anonymous leaflets opposing a proposed school tax
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levy.151 Citing historical protection of anonymous First Amendment rights, the Court
struck down the Ohio statute.152 The Court noted that the First Amendment affords “the
broadest protection” to core political expression, to ensure an unfettered exchange of
ideas to bring “political and social changes desired by the people.”153 The Court
concluded that ballot measures did not carry the threat of corruption and circumvention
that would trigger Buckley’s three justifications.154 Scalia offered the lone dissent,
nothing that the Court was ignoring its primary justification of informational interest in
Buckley.155
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc. (“ACLF”), the Court
again addressed disclosures related to “core political speech.”156 ACLF addressed two
compelled disclosure requirements in the context of ballot initiative petitions. The first
required petition circulators to wear a name badge while soliciting initiative signatures;
151
152

McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334. CHECK THIS.
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346-47 (“[D]iscussion of public issues and debate on the

qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution”); id. at 342 (citing historically significant anonymous
works such as the Federalist Papers).
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the other required disclosure of the names and addresses of all paid circulators.157 A
unanimous Court struck down the name badge requirement, citing concerns that the
requirement would chill speech and indicating that the provision lacked a sufficient state
interest.158 A majority also struck down the circulator reporting provisions.159 The Court
reasoned that ballot initiatives did not involve the risk of “quid pro quo corruption present
when money is paid to, or for, candidates”160 and noted that the statute’s other
disclosure provisions sufficiently promoted the state’s antifraud and informational
interests.161
The Court’s exacting scrutiny melted away in McConnell v. FEC,162 however,
where the Court applied a more deferential standard to uphold key portions of BCRA,
“the most important piece of federal campaign finance legislation in a generation,”
against a facial constitutional challenge.163 Likely because McConnell invoked
contribution disclosures instead of core political speech disclosures, the majority
opinion paid little attention to the apparent tension created by McIntyre, relegating it to a
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35

mere footnote.164 The Court held that BCRA’s extension of contribution disclosure rules
furthered the same three interests promulgated in Buckley: deterring corruption,
providing information to voters, and aiding in the enforcement of other campaign finance
law. 165 However, the Court largely ignored constitutional questions.166 Thus, the
McConnell decision “overall displays unprecedented deference to congressional
judgments and appears to apply only cursory attention to First Amendment interests
that might be balanced in evaluating any campaign finance regime.”167
B.

Cloudy Transparency: HLOGA is Likely Constitutional But Could Be
Better

Many of the critiques discussed in section III(C) (“What HLOGA Does and Why It
Falls Short”) are relevant to the inquiry of whether HLOGA is constitutional. For
example, the critique that HLOGA fails to apply to all bundlers is relevant in the
constitutional analysis when balancing the government interests (i.e. deterring
corruption) against the infringement on constitutional rights. Thus, several of the
critiques discussed above are applied here under a constitutional analysis.
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The Supreme Court cases discussed above provide a constitutional framework to
evaluate HLOGA’s bundling disclosure provision. The Court’s history regarding
disclosures has been mixed, with the Court paying less deference to laws restricting
core political speech and more deference to laws requiring contribution disclosures.
The preliminary question, then, is whether HLOGA’s bundling provision involves core
political speech, contribution disclosures or something in between. After settling on the
appropriate level of scrutiny, the next step is to identify the government’s interests and
weigh them against any constitutional infringement. In the past, the Court has
continuously cited reducing corruption and the appearance of corruption as a
compelling government interest that justifies disclosures. Likewise, the Court has held
that disclosures provide useful information to voters and assist in enforcement of other
campaign finance law.
1.

Level of Scrutiny

The preliminary question is whether HLOGA’s bundling provision involves core
political speech, contribution disclosures or something in between. HLOGA’s bundling
provision regulates activity of lobbyists who collect or solicit contributions from
individuals. This involves disclosure of contributions, but also invokes freedom of
association because bundlers function by soliciting checks from others. Accordingly,
HLOGA’s bundling provision is not a straightforward Buckley contribution disclosure
because it targets bundler’s solicitation or collection of others’ contributions rather
than the contributions themselves. The Provision is “contribution-like,” however,

37

because it involves individual contributions and can carry a quid pro quo potential
similar to that of large contributions.168
The Court should not classify the Provision as impacting core political speech like
the anonymous leaflets from McIntyre or the ballot measure initiatives from ALCF.
Though arguably bundling individuals, like the elderly woman distributing anonymous
pamphlets in McIntyre, have a right to anonymous political speech169 and contribute to
the marketplace of ideas by associating with like-minded political individuals when
soliciting money for their preferred candidate, bundling falls short of core political
speech.170 Bundling does not involve the “marketplace of ideas” for bringing about the
political and social changes desired by the people, but rather, more closely mirrors the
contribution and expenditure disclosures upheld in Buckley, which required individuals
and groups advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office to file
168
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preventing corruption of voters; likewise, some argue that a secret “donation booth”
could better prevent corruption of candidates and elected officials, without infringing on
first amendment speech and association rights. Going even further, some argue that
donor anonymity should be mandatory. See generally Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayers,
Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (2002) (endorsing a
combination of mandatory donation anonymity and campaign finance vouchers).
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reports.171 Similarly, full bundling disclosure requires campaigns to file reports detailing
the name, mailing address, employer, occupation, amount of bundled money and other
relevant information. Thus, the Court should apply intermediate scrutiny, requiring
HLOGA’s disclosure provision to be justified by an important public interest and have
a relevant correlation or substantial relation to the public interest being served.172
2.

Deterring Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption

After settling on the appropriate level of scrutiny, the next step is to identify the
government’s interests and weigh them against any constitutional infringement. In
Buckley, the Supreme Court justified restrictions on campaign contributions as follows:
“[T]he primary interest served by these limitations . . . is the prevention of corruption and
the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of
large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to
office.”173 While this language applies to contribution limits instead of disclosures, it
articulates the Court’s reasoning regarding the appearance of corruption, suggesting
that the Court considers the appearance of corruption to be a serious problem. This
simplifies the constitutional analysis by eliminating the inquiry of whether apparent
corruption is real or imagined.174
171
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HLOGA’s bundling provision serves the government’s interest of preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption because disclosures act as a check on
lobbyists and the candidates receiving their money by exposing them to public scrutiny.
Section II cites several examples of illegal fundraising through bundling and the
appointment of bundlers in administrations. These stories, at the very least, create an
impression of impropriety. The documentation of bundling problems and the Court’s
longstanding approval the government’s anticorruption interest, suggests the Court
should find that HLOGA is served by the important government interest of deterring
corruption and the appearance of corruption.
The next step under the constitutional analysis is to scrutinize the means-end
relationship between the law and its asserted purposes. The Court should apply an
intermediate scrutiny, requiring that HLOGA have a relevant or substantial relation to
the government’s interest of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.175
The Provision applies only to lobbyist bundlers and may carry an unintended effect of
actually strengthening bundling, which weakens the means-end relationship.
As discussed extensively elsewhere, several studies estimate that only three
percent of known bundlers in the 2008 presidential campaign are lobbyists.176 While
this percentage reflects lobbyists in presidential campaigns as opposed to all bundlers,
it powerfully illustrates that lobbyist bundlers do not dominate the world of big bundling.
contributions have a real affect on congressional voting for issues that are most
important to large contributors).
175
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Because lobbyist bundlers represent a fraction of all bundlers, the Provision leaves a
large majority of bundling activity completely undisclosed. Further, the Provision applies
only to congressional bundling, which leaves presidential bundling completely
undisclosed.
Further, the “light of publicity” might actually enable corruptive influences.177
“This will be a boon for reporters in search of stories, but it won't diminish the power of
Washington's top lobbyists. Such federal disclosure . . . provides ‘free advertising’ for
[lobbyists] . . . to woo special interests craving influence and lawmakers in need of
campaign cash.”178 One lobbyist noted that before the Act, lobbyist bundling was the
stuff of tall tales spun with fellow lobbyists over drinks, debating who brought in the
biggest bundle.179 After the Act, the lobbyist said he enjoys “full disclosure with a
congressional blessing.”180 Some believe this “free advertising” might actually spur
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lobbyists to compete harder to raise money, which could undermine the Act’s
effectiveness in curbing corruption and the appearance of corruption.181
These problems weaken the means-end relationship between HLOGA’s purpose
of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption and what it actually achieves.
However, while the Provision could carry the unintended negative consequence of
providing increased credibility to bundlers with which they can seek greater influence,
such publicity could also make politicians more careful when considering granting a
favor or appointment. Because the Court should employ intermediate scrutiny, the
Court would only inquire whether the law had a relevant or substantial relation to the
asserted government interest.182 Accordingly, the Court should find that requiring
disclosure of lobbyist bundlers has a substantial relation to reducing corruption or the
appearance of corruption by exposing lobbyist bundlers and the candidates who accept
their money to “the light of publicity.”183
3.

Providing Information to Voters

Under Buckley’s second justification – providing information to voters – the
Provision is likely justified. The Court has repeatedly endorsed the informational
interest of disclosures. HLOGA’s information about lobbyist bundlers allows voters to
make better-informed decisions by disclosing which lobbyists are bundling for
congressional candidates. The transparency associated with disclosure allows the
181
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available

at

public to track contribution trends and speak with their vote by punishing candidates
who are corrupt or appear corrupt. The improvement may be slight, however, given the
number of bundlers who are not lobbyists, and HLOGA’s application only to
congressional elections. Further, as noted, the Provision currently suffers from vague
language that could hamper meaningful reporting if interpreted unfavorably.
While generally favoring disclosure as a means of providing information to voters,
the McIntyre Court concluded that a voter’s informational interest of identifying a
leaflet’s writer did not justify the disclosure requirements in the statute.184 Information
provided by HLOGA’s bundling provision might not be overwhelming, given the limited
information the Provision provides (especially when compared to what it could have
provided). However, under an intermediate scrutiny, HLOGA’s disclosure requirement
has a substantial relation to increasing transparency and thereby providing information
to voters. By allowing the public and the media to access information about candidates
and their bundlers, the public has the capacity to make better decisions about who they
choose in an election.185 Thus, while the information provided by the Act is under184
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to track and report lobbyist bundling activities using primary sources, namely FEC
reports. The FEC also recently released its own online campaign finance tracking tool
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inclusive, it is nevertheless constitutionally justified because it provides useful
information to the public.
4.

Aiding in the Enforcement of Other Campaign
Finance Law

HLOGA fulfills Buckley’s final justification – assisting in the enforcement of other
campaign finance laws – in several ways. A significant problem associated with
bundling is that fundraisers can use it to circumvent campaign contribution limits.
Related to this problem is that bundlers can coerce donors into contributing, which in
addition to violating campaign finance law, also inhibits the contributors’ first
amendment rights.186
HLOGA’s main impact on the enforcement of existing campaign finance law is its
transparency. Because HLOGA requires disclosure of lobbyist bundlers, the FEC (or
the “watchdog” media) can identify bundling that violates existing campaign finance
laws.187 For example, the Wall Street Journal relied on publicly available FEC

called “Campaign Finance Maps” that allows the public to track Congressional and
Presidential election contributions. The Provision would supplement the information
provided in this tool. See Administering and Enforcing Federal Campaign Finance Law,
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contribution reports to break the Hsu story by tracking Hsu’s contributions to the Paws,
which eventually led to Hsu’s indictment for campaign finance violations.188 Disclosure
of lobbyist bundlers would allow the public, the media and the FEC to review bundling
disclosures for these “red flags” – potential circumvention of existing campaign laws –
and take legal or political action.
Under an intermediate scrutiny, the means-end relationship is likely sufficient.
Arguably, lobbyists are more familiar with campaign finance laws (because bundling is
part of their job) and are accordingly accustomed to following them. Thus, exposing
seasoned lobbyists to scrutiny but leaving the vast majority of bundlers in the shadows
perhaps does little to aid in the enforcement of other campaign finance laws overall.
After all, under the Provision, Hsu’s contributions but not bundling activities would have
been a matter of public record because he was not a lobbyist. However, even if this is
true, lobbyist bundlers could conceivably violate existing campaign finance laws while
bundling. Thus, under the intermediate scrutiny standard HLOGA is substantially
related to assisting in the enforcement of other campaign finance laws because it allows
the public and government to review lobbyists bundling for campaign finance violations.
V.

IN THE INTEREST OF FULL DISCLOSURE: EFFECTIVE BUNDLING LAW
MUST GO BEYOND HLOGA
The modern debate over campaign finance laws is driven by two fundamentally

different attitudes about the relationship between money and campaigns.189 One side
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rests upon the idea that human beings are not angels,190 so legislation is needed to
prevent money from corrupting politicians and harming democracy by robbing voters of
power.191 At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who view restrictions on
political money as weakening democracy because they limit freedom of speech and
naturally favor incumbents.192 Despite these seemingly polar opposite views, both
philosophies favor disclosure.193 “Disclosure is the basic foundation on which all other
[campaign finance] regulation must rest.”194 Thus, building an effective foundation for
campaign finance reform is important.195
190
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To approach effective bundling reform, all federal candidates must disclose all
big bundlers (those raising more than $15,000 in a 6-month period). The reason
Congress chose to single out lobbyists is unclear, but it may be because the Act was
regarded mainly as lobbyist and ethics legislation196 and because the provision was only
added after the bill went to the Senate.197 During congressional testimony regarding the
bundling provision, however, an election law expert testified:
[M]uch of the money raised for federal campaigns (in particular, for
presidential campaigns) is not raised by lobbyists but by friends of a
candidate or by senior corporate executives who do not meet the definition
of 'lobbyist.' The bundling rules only apply to contributions collected or
arranged by those defined as lobbyists. If Congress is interested in a
more complete disclosure provision, it would have to apply to all

blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock”); Luke
6:48 (“a man . . . who digged deep, and laid the foundation on a rock: and when the
flood arose, the stream brake against that house, and could not shake it: because it was
well builded”).
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individuals, not just lobbyists. Consequently, the bundling provision as
written . . . is vague and open to misapplication.198
Arguably, laws targeting lobbyists affect those who are in the business of affecting
legislation are more strongly justified under Buckley’s prong of preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption. However, lawyers, business leaders and individuals
may also seek to influence legislation, even if they are not directly paid to do so.
Business leaders and lawyers also have a high stake in influencing legislation because
their financial profitability is directly connected to the legislation.199 Individuals also
might bundle in hopes of obtaining personal favors or appointments.200 Accordingly,
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contributions from law firms, businesses and individuals also have a potential for
corruption or for the appearance of corruption. Thus, the distinction between lobbyists
and other bundlers cannot be justified. To single out lobbyists simply because their
official “job” is to influence legislation, largely misses the point as well as an opportunity
to enact effective bundling disclosure.
Disclosures provide minimal infringement upon free speech, as compared with
more stringent forms of bundling legislation, such as direct restrictions on bundling or a
bundling ban.201 Accordingly, full bundling disclosure represents a relatively
unrestrictive means of achieving the three important public interests from Buckley. Full
disclosure would more powerfully deter corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption by exposing all large bundlers to the “light of publicity.”202 Likewise, the
informational benefit to voters would be greater than HLOGA’s current provision
because the public would have a more complete understanding of where candidates
201
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receive their money. Finally, full bundling disclosure would assist in the enforcement of
other campaign laws because all bundlers would be subject to public and FEC scrutiny.
Because such disclosures would include all bundlers and apply to all federal elections,
the disclosures would be substantially related to important governmental interests of
deterring corruption, providing information to voters, and aiding in enforcement of other
campaign finance laws, thus satisfying “intermediate scrutiny.”203
Creating full transparency in the bundling process would not solve all problems
associated with bundling. “No campaign finance reform, however attractive, can ever
work like a magic bullet.”204 Any disclosure requirement implicitly depends upon: (1)
candidates and political organizations accurately reporting most of the activities and
relationships of importance to voters, (2) timely and user-friendly reports, (3) interested,
knowledgeable people who read, interpret and provide useful information to voters, and
(4) voters who are able and willing to use the information as a basis for making an
election decision.205 If any of these steps fails, the chain breaks. For example, if
reporting requirements are easily sidestepped (step 1) or not consistently applied (see
discussion of intermediaries in Section III), disclosure laws become powerless.
Likewise, if voters care more about other issues than they care about campaign funding
(step 4), they will not act upon what they learn from disclosure, which undermines the
idea that disclosure will hold campaigns accountable.
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Likewise, bundling disclosure does little to tackle broader campaign finance
problems. “Changing an election system requires something more than just rewriting a
statute.”206 Effective campaign finance reform requires a multi-pronged approach that
includes disclosure, contribution limits, spending limits, and public financing.207 For
example, the fact that candidates turn to bundlers and lobbyists to raise money at all is
arguably problematic. Momentum is growing for reform to public financing legislation
that would make the system for viable for candidates, thus reducing the pressure to
raise cash from individuals.208 Public finance reform would serve to generally remove
the influence of money in elections, which would have a powerful affect on bundling.
While this article cannot fully discuss public financing, it references public financing to
illustrate that no single approach to bundling reform is a “silver bullet.”
However, while no “silver bullet,” bundling disclosure gives voters the capacity to
“connect the dots” between the flow of money and political favors and allows the FEC to
identify problematic bundling activities. Further, it is exceedingly simple to implement
and is a relatively unrestrictive means of bringing greater transparency to the bundling
206
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process. Bundling disclosure, then, is something that can be accomplished “right here,
right now” to improve bundling and the perhaps improve the public perception of the
influence of money in campaigns. Thus, complete disclosure of all bundling activities
should be adopted.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Bundling is a powerful and useful tool for candidates. However, it also poses
serious problems related to the appearance of corruption and circumvention of existing
campaign finance laws. Under the Open Government and Honest Leadership Act,
Congress cast light upon lobbyist bundlers. However, it left non-lobbyist bundlers, like
Norman Hsu, in the safety of the shadows. Unfortunately, there are likely many, many
more Norman Hsus out there.209 HLOGA’s bundling provision represents a positive, yet
flawed first step towards tackling problems associated with bundling. Under the Buckley
framework, the Act is likely constitutional, but must be expanded to be more effective.
To seriously address problems associated with bundling, the bundling provision must
apply to all persons (instead of the Act’s lobbyist-only “persons”) and to all federal
elections (instead of the Act’s application only to congressional campaigns). Complete
bundling disclosure is closely related to the government’s interests of deterring
corruption and the appearance of corruption, providing information to voters, and aiding
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in enforcement of other campaign finance laws. Only through complete disclosure will
bundling approach a meaningful transparency.210
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